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Abstract: Research in economics is anthropocentric. It only cares about the 
welfare of humans, and usually does not concern itself with animals. When it does, 
animals are treated as resources, biodiversity, or food. That is, animals only have 
instrumental value for humans. Yet unlike water, trees or vegetables, and like 
humans, most animals have a brain and a nervous system. They can feel pain and 
pleasure, and many argue that their welfare should matter. Some economic studies 
value animal welfare, but only indirectly through humans’ altruistic valuation. This 
overall position of economics is inconsistent with the utilitarian tradition and can be 
qualified as speciesist. We suggest that economics should directly value the welfare 
of sentient animals, at least sometimes. We briefly discuss some possible 
implications and challenges for (environmental) economics.  
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Imagine that a super-intelligent species invades Earth. The superior intelligence of 
these aliens allows them to take over political power. Current living humans cannot 
make sense of their technology, knowledge, art or culture, nor can they comprehend 
their moral rules and legal obligations. Alien society is wealthy, egalitarian and to a 
large extent much better than existing human societies. Some aliens are economists 
who study how to allocate resources and design incentives. In particular, welfare 
economists have designed and applied sophisticated fairness concepts, but these 
concepts only concern aliens, not humans. Alien environmental economists study 
how to preserve the environment and humans and (nonhuman) animals from 
extinction, and their studies thus contribute to maintaining biodiversity on Earth. 
Aliens only police their society. If animals commit violence towards humans in the 
natural environment, aliens do not interfere. Aliens like to eat humans but they care 
about human welfare to some extent. For instance, while most humans raised for 
food live inside big production factories, some are free-range, which is better for their 
welfare but increases the price of human meat. 
 
The storyline of the invasion of Earth by a superior species is standard in science 
fiction books or movies, such as The Planet of the Apes. It offers a reversal of 
perspective and stimulates reflection on issues such as domination and hierarchy 
between different species. Although our story is pure fiction, we believe the issues it 
raises are very real and should be taken seriously by economists. Specifically, this 
paper is motivated by the observation that economics research has been so far 
almost exclusively anthropocentric. Without excuse nor discussion, economists 
consider only the welfare of humans in their studies. At best, economists assume 
that animals have an instrumental, or indirect, value. Animals are typically viewed as 
resources, parts of ecosystems, inputs to biodiversity or food for humans. Yet, 
animals are not “things”. Unlike rocks, water, trees or vegetables, and like us, most 
animals have a brain and a nervous system. They can feel pain and pleasure, and 
many argue that this should matter for welfare analysis and policy making.  
 
This paper emphasizes the need to reconsider our anthropocentric approach in 
(environmental) economics and to view animals as distinct from the rest of nature. 
As a starting point in this reflection, we discuss some justifications, possibilities and 
difficulties for integrating and valuing directly the welfare of animals in economic 
models. The outline is the following. We start in Section 2 by presenting a brief and 
selective summary of the longstanding discussions in philosophy regarding the moral 
consideration of animals. In Section 3, we present a brief overview of the populations 
of animals as well as their evolution and we discuss the central concept of sentience. 
Sections 2 and 3 may thus serve as an introduction to the topic for economists 
broadly interested in animals, and provide several seminal references in philosophy 




ways animals have been studied by economists in different subfields, while in 
Section 5 we present a few early attempts in economics to value directly animals in 
the social objective. Finally, we offer a short discussion in the concluding section.  
 
1. The Moral Consideration of Animals in Philosophy 
 
We find the first traces of concern for the treatment of animals in ancient Greek 
philosophy. Aristotle, for one, viewed animals as resources and wrote that “we may 
infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake, and that the other 
animals exist for the sake of man…if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing 
in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man” 
(Aristotle 350 B.C.). Even then, however, philosophers began to question whether 
animals do deserve moral consideration. Socrates, in Plato’s The Republic: “Would 
this habit of eating animals not require that we slaughter animals that we knew as 
individuals, and in whose eyes we could gaze and see ourselves reflected, only a 
few hours before our meal?” (360 BC).  
 
Although other famous philosophers such as Plutarch and Porphyry also questioned 
meat eating habits, skepticism regarding the moral status of animals remained the 
common view for centuries. René Descartes, in a letter to Henry More of 5 February 
1649, famously thought of animals as automata or machines: “it seems reasonable 
since art copies nature, and men can make various automata which move without 
thought, that nature should produce its own automata much more splendid than the 
artificial ones. These natural automata are the animals.” Concern for animal interests 
picked up significant steam in the Enlightenment era. Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(1755) introduced the concept of “sensibilité” or sentience. Voltaire (1764) was 
unconvinced by Descartes’ reasoning and wrote a harsh critique. The early 
utilitarians, such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill were particularly 
influential. Bentham (1780), for instance, argued that when considering whether to 
value animal interests intrinsically, we should keep in mind that “The question is not, 
Can they reason? Nor Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?”. Here Bentham is 
invoking the “sentientist view of moral considerability” (Gruen 2017). The ability to 
experience positive or negative states such as happiness and suffering is often put 
forward as the fundamental criterion of moral consideration.  
 
Such views are also held by contemporary utilitarians. Probably the most famous, 
Peter Singer, author of the seminal book Animal Liberation (1975), argued that 
because animals are sentient, they have interests (such as the interest in not 
suffering). In his view, ignoring animal interests is a form of arbitrary discrimination 
akin to racism. After Richard Ryder first coined the term, Peter Singer popularised 
the concept of “speciesism” in the following form: “the racist violates the principle of 
equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of his own race, when 




Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater 
interests of members of other species. The pattern is the same in each case.”  
 
A central argument in Singer’s writings is called “the argument from marginal cases”. 
In short, if one believes that humans have moral value, but animals do not, then it is 
likely that there is an inconsistency in the reasoning behind it. For example, one can 
claim that animals do not have moral value because they do not possess a certain 
level of intelligence. The logical consequence would be that humans without that 
level of intelligence also do not have moral value (such as babies, mentally 
handicapped, people with Alzheimer’s disease etc.). Moreover, if animal welfare 
counts, there is the question of the trade-off between human and animal welfare, and 
in particular the thorny question of meat eating. On this matter, Singer (1980) argued 
that utilitarianism logically implies vegetarianism as “the pleasures of taste - which 
are not the same as the pleasures of eating - are relatively trivial by comparison with 
the interests of, say, a pig in being able to move freely, mingle with other animals, 
and generally avoid the boredom and confinement of factory farm life”. 
Enlightenment rights theorists, such as Immanuel Kant (1780), by contrast, thought 
that animals should not be valued intrinsically. They are not part of his categorical 
imperative. More recently, deontologists have been more sympathetic to animals. 
John Rawls (1971) and Robert Nozick (1974), for instance, believed that animals’ 
welfare should be given some weight, conditional on there being no infringement on 
human rights. Tom Regan (1983), perhaps the most well-known animal rights 
philosopher, believed that as animals are “subjects-of-a-life”, who “want and prefer 
things, believe and feel things, recall and expect things. And all these dimensions of 
our life, including our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our 
satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence or our untimely death—all make 
a difference to the quality of our life as lived, as experienced, by us as individuals. As 
the same is true of … animals … they too must be viewed as the experiencing 
subjects of a life, with inherent value of their own.” Therefore, Regan argues, certain 
animals in principle should have the same rights as humans. Gary Francione (2008) 
or Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson (2011), among others, have also been 
proponents of these kinds of arguments, arguing that animals should not be the 
property of humans.1  
 
The aforementioned philosophers are clearly not representative of philosophers in 
general (for one, many schools of moral thought have not been mentioned). 
However, some survey studies of academic philosophers provide additional 
information on their attitudes towards animals. Joshua Rust and Eric Schwitzgebel 
(2014) find for instance that ethicists are more likely to think that it is wrong to eat 
                                                 
1 For reasons of space, we cannot further develop modern approaches in philosophy on the moral 
consideration of animals (see for instance Sunstein and Nussbaum (2004), Holtug (2007), Rowlands 




animals and actually eat fewer animals than other academics. 60% of ethicists 
thought that eating mammal meat was bad to some degree, significantly more than 
other philosophers (45%) and professors (19%). The Rust and Schwitzgebel study 
was replicated for philosophers in German-speaking countries (Schönegger and 
Wagner 2019). Again, moral philosophers were more likely to say that eating meat 
was immoral and consumed less meat than the other groups.2 
 
More generally, the majority of philosophers regardless of their tradition, 
(consequentialism, deontology, virtue ethics, phenomenology, etc.) who have 
expressed an opinion on animal interests, think that they have positive intrinsic value 
and deserve some moral consideration (Armstrong and Botzler 2003). It therefore 
seems that moral philosophers are more sympathetic to valuing animals intrinsically 
than most other scholars. The takeaway for economists is that incorporating animal 
interests directly into the social objective represents a plausible improvement to 
normative analysis. This is particularly true when considering that consequentialism, 
upon which normative economic analysis is almost exclusively founded, has a strong 
history of taking animal interests seriously. As Johansson-Stenman (2018) says: “It 
is somewhat paradoxical that economics, which from an ethical point of view almost 
entirely builds on consequentialism, is nevertheless built on assumptions that 
resemble Kant's (or Carruthers's) rather than Bentham's (or Singer's) perception with 
respect to animal suffering.” 
 
2. Animals in this World  
 
We have emphasized in the previous section that many philosophers believe that 
animals deserve moral consideration. Since animals are everywhere in this world, 
this likely has implications for human economic decision and policy making. To get a 
better sense of what these implications might be, we first outline in this section the 
most populous categories of animals, and present some recent evolutions of these 
populations. We also discuss the central concept of animal sentience. Unfortunately, 
this section is necessarily highly incomplete and speculative. For population 
numbers, wild animal estimates are particularly uncertain and we often provide rough 
order of magnitude estimates.3 For issues regarding sentience, we emphasize the 
lack of a  global definition, scientific uncertainty and methodological limitations. 
                                                 
2 We are not aware of studies about economists’ opinions and habits about meat eating. Data 
obtained from the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (EAERE) 
conference organizers over the last few years indicate that about 15% of conference participants 
order vegetarian meals (personal communication). 
3 It seems that biologists have not invested a lot of effort trying to estimate animal population 
numbers. Kevin Gaston and Tim Blackburn (1997) write that “Attempts to assess the magnitude of 
global biodiversity have focussed on estimating species richness. […] The total number of individual 
organisms in the world. […] has been a largely ignored statistic.” Brian Tomasik, who has informally 
estimated wild animal populations, supports this view, citing an article in Nature Communications 
(Veresolgu, Halley and Rillig 2015): “This Nature Communications article uses my estimates of 









While it is hard to find global numbers for pets, some figures give a sense of the 
order of magnitude. There are about 300 million pets in the U.S. with the most 
common being fish (105 million), cats (86 million) and dogs (78 million) (Green 
2016). 48% of U.S. households own a dog, and 38 % own a cat (APPA 2018). At the 
EU-28 level, in 2016, 18% of households own a dog, 26% own a cat, and around 
35% own any kind of pet (FEDIAF 2017). A naive extrapolation assuming the rate of 
pet ownership around the world is the same as in the U.S. would suggest a global 
pet population of 6.8 billion. 
 
Animals used in science 
 
In 2005, there were around 115.3 million vertebrate lab animals used per year 
(Taylor et al. 2005). However, the number of animals alive at any given time is likely 
to be less than 100 million (Fraser and MacRae 2011). A large number of 
invertebrates are also used, but the number of animals does not appear to have 




Livestock outnumber laboratory animals and pets. The Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations estimates the total population to be over 
30 billion. The breakdown of these numbers into species is reproduced below.  
 









Geese and guinea fowls 371 
Rabbits and hares 309 
                                                                                                                                                        
projections of global population estimates for taxonomic groups found in ‘Tomasik B. (2014) How 
Many Wild Animals Are There?’." This reinforces my impression that there has been surprisingly little 









Pigeons, other birds 27 
Rodents, other 19 
Mules 9 
Camelids, other 9 
Animals live nes 1 
Table 1. Estimated numbers of animals in agriculture. Numbers are rounded to the nearest 




Kelly Witwicki (2019) estimates that there are 111.3 billion farmed fish alive at any 
given moment. Alison Mood and P. Brooke (2012) estimate that 37 to 120 billion fish 




Birds – Gaston and Blackburn (1997) use multiple methods which all give 
“surprisingly consistent estimates of a global bird population of between 200 billion 
and 400 billion individuals”. Other estimates find populations of between 100 billion 
and 400 billion (Fisher and Peterson 1964, de Juana 1992). Gaston, Blackburn and 
Kees Klein Goldewijk (2003) estimate the number of breeding birds at 86.7 billion. 
This coheres with the larger overall bird population.  
 
Mammals – Gaverick Matheny and Kai Chan (2005) use wild mammal densities that 
correspond to 2.25 wild bird densities.4 Using the population estimates of 200 billion 
to 400 billion birds, this yields 450 billion to 900 billion mammals.  
 
Reptiles – Tomasik (2009) uses estimates of reptile population density by Ishwar, 
N.M, Ravi Chellam and Ajith Kumar (2011) and Douglas Raegan and Robert Waide 
(1996) along with estimates of the total global area of tropical regions from Gaston et 
al. (2003), to calculate approximate worldwide reptile populations. He suggests that 
there are between 100 billion and 10 trillion reptiles. 
 
                                                 
4 This is very rough and possibly an underestimate. The authors write: “Based on a British study by 
Gaston and Evans (2004) and Harris et al. (1995), here we assume the densities of wild mammals 
are 2.25 times those of wild birds for each land-use type. Applied to other continents, this is probably 
a significant underestimate, as Peters (1983, p. 167) records densities for some individual North 




Amphibians – Tomasik (2009) extrapolates from various estimates of local 
amphibian population densities calculated by Karthikeyan Vasudevan, Ajith Kumar 
and Ravi Chellam (2001), Vasudevan, Kumar, Barry R. Noon and Chellam (2008), 
Ching-Yu Huand and Ping-Chun Lucy Hou (2004) and Raegan and Waide (1996) to 
estimate a global amphibian population of 100 billion and 10 trillion. 
 
Fish – Worldwide fish biomass is estimated to be in the vicinity of 1 to 2 billion 
tonnes (wet mass) (Wilson et al. 2009, Jennings et al. 2008). Some suggest that 
early estimation techniques which involved trawling nets greatly underestimate fish 
biomass. Newer estimates involving acoustic methods suggest that the biomass of 
mesopelagic fish alone is 10 billion tonnes (Kaartvedt, Staby and Aksnes 2012, 
Irigoien et al. 2014). Mood and Brooke (2010) find that 77.4 million tonnes of fish 
corresponded to 0.97 to 2.74 trillion individual fish. Naively applying these 
conversion rates to the 10 billion tonnes figure gives worldwide wild fish population 
estimates of 125.3 trillion to 354 trillion individual fish. Using a different estimation 
method, Yinon Bar-On, Rob Philipps and Ron Milo (2018) estimate approximately 
one quadrillion fish.5 
 
Other (insects etc.) – Less cognitively complex animals are many orders of 
magnitude more populous than the previous groups (Williams 1960, Tomasik 2009). 
In the interest of space, we do not conduct a review but note that even very low 
probabilities of moral consideration (or very weak sentience) would still imply 
endowing them some weight in our decision making.  
 
Some evolutions and human-animal interactions 
 
The above data are static and uninformative regarding the evolution of animal 
populations and the role of human-animal interactions. In the Anthropocene era, the 
interactions of humans with animals are numerous and multifaceted. Humans have 
wide impacts on animal populations and the environments in which they live. The 
recent global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services of the 
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
(IPBES 2019) emphasizes that the rate of species extinction is tens to hundreds of 
times higher than the average rate over the past 10 million years and is accelerating. 
About 1 million species are at risk of extinction nowadays, half of those are plants or 
animals and half are insects. IPBES (2019) identify five main direct drivers of 
                                                 
5 The authors explain their method: “In order to estimate the total number of fish, we rely on our 
estimate for the total biomass of fish of ≈0.5 Gt C and estimate the mean mass of an individual 
mesopelagic fish, as mesopelagic fish are the main contributor to the total fish biomass. In order to 
estimate the mean mass of an individual mesopelagic fish, we use empirical allometric relations 
between fish length and mass, along with ranges for the lengths of different mesopelagic fish species 
(301). From the available data, we estimate an average individual mass of ≈0.5 g C per fish (...). This 





biodiversity loss: changes in land and sea use; direct exploitation of organisms; 
climate change; pollution; and invasion of alien species.  
 
Humans have had a significant effect on the balance of life on Earth, reducing 
habitats and driving some species to extinction. Bar-On, Philipps and Milo (2018) 
offer different metrics to gauge the human impact on animal populations. They 
compile hundreds of local and global recent studies to compute the biosphere 
biomass composition in terms of gigatons of carbon. Figure 1A shows that plants 
dominate terrestrial and marine life forms, accounting for over 80% of all living 
biomass. All animals, namely mammals plus fish, insects, worms, birds, and others, 
account for only 0.37% of biomass. Figure 1B shows that fish represent more than 
100 times the biomass of humans, and humans represent almost 100 times the 
biomass of wild (terrestrial) mammals. Note that the biomass of livestock is almost 
twice that of humans. Figure 2 underlines the recent prevalence of domesticated 
animals’ biomass over human and wild animal biomass, further illustrating the wide 
indirect impact of humans on the planet through their food production. 
 
 
Figure 1 (Bar-on, Philipps and Milo 2018). Graphical representation of the global biomass 
distribution by taxa. (A) Absolute biomasses of different taxa are represented using a Voronoi 
diagram, with the area of each cell being proportional to that taxa global biomass (the specific shape 
of each polygon carries no meaning). (B) Absolute biomass of different animal taxa. Related groups 







Figure 2. Estimated biomass of wild animals, domesticated animals, and humans. Source: 




     
As aforementioned, sentience is often presented as the fundamental criterion for 
moral consideration. However, a clear and commonly accepted definition of 
sentience is lacking. According to Donald Broom (2014), sentience is “having the 
awareness and the cognitive ability necessary to have feelings” and to “perceive and 
experience”. Using this definition, many studies in animal sciences are relevant to 
assess sentience. This is what the journal Animal Sentience, wholly dedicated to the 
notion, is trying to do. It includes research on animal cognition, emotions, pain, 
metacognition, consciousness and ability to learn, remember, plan and recognize 
other individuals,. The notion of consciousness is central but notoriously hard to 
study. David Chalmers explains: “The really hard problem of consciousness is the 
problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information - 
processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is 
something it is like to be a conscious organism… It is undeniable that some 
organisms are subjects of experience...It is widely agreed that experience arises 
from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises.” 
(Chalmers 1995).  
 
We have no good understanding of the mechanism by which consciousness arises, 
and it is, therefore, difficult to know whether other animals are sentient. For complex 
species with physiological similarities to humans, this problem is less important 
because physiological correlates of different conscious states in humans can be 
measured in such animals (Edelman, Baars and Seth 2005). Doing so provides 
strong evidence of sentience for mammals, and even birds and cephalopods (Baars 
2001, Edelman, Baars and Seth 2005). Temple Grandin (2006) notes the similarities 




which is the part of the [human] brain associated with emotion, looked almost exactly 
like the limbic system of a pig’s brain.” Another part of the brain, the neocortex also 
plays a central role in emotions, along with perceptions, abstraction, and language in 
mammals. 
 
There is also evidence of consciousness in animals such as birds and octopuses. 
The well-known Cambridge Declaration on Animal Consciousness (2012) states that: 
“The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from 
experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that non-human 
animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological 
substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional 
behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not 
unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-
human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, 
including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.” 
 
As the physiological correlates of consciousness begin to differ more widely from 
those found in humans, such as in reptiles, amphibians, and fish we can hardly rely 
on physical similarities (Seth 2016). Evidence for sentience in these species is, 
therefore, weaker (Butler and Cotterill 2006). When we consider less complex 
species like terrestrial arthropods, we are forced to rely even more on mechanistic 
explanations of consciousness as opposed to physiological similarity, none of which 
are particularly satisfying. Anil Seth (2016) argues that we should apply the 
precautionary principle and therefore take seriously the possibility that such animals 
are conscious, while Simon Knutsonn and Christian Munthe (2017) put forward “A 
virtue of precaution regarding the moral status of animals with uncertain sentience.” 
 
Animal cognitive capacities vary widely depending on the natural environment such 
as the diet or the use of foraging techniques (Rosati 2017), as well as social life 
(Dunbar and Shultz 2007). Evan MacLean et al. (2014) emphasize that differences in 
absolute (not relative) brain volume best predict performance across species. 
However, others argue that total brain size “has been shown to be a poor indicator of 
both intelligence and sentience” and “it should be the complexity of the brain’s 
function that is considered in regards to welfare, rather than its size” (Proctor 2012). 
Some animal species function very well even with small brains. Small animals 
usually have smaller brains than large animals, but their ability to quickly process 
information and make decisions is usually greater. Various comparison studies 
across animals indicate that the neocortex size is proportional to the size of the 
group (Broom 2014). Rogers and Kaplan (2004) think that a better measure of brain 
capacity “might be the number of neurons versus glial cells, number of dendrites per 
neuron, or the number of synaptic connections per neuron (...), or some other 
measure reflecting neural mechanisms." They further note that only a “handful of 




many more species might be found to have exceptional cognitive abilities, if we only 
looked.” 
    
Moreover, there is no strong reason to expect a systematic relation between 
cognitive and physical ability to suffer. Richard Dawkins (2011) for instance argues: 
“Isn’t it plausible that a clever species such as our own might need less pain, 
precisely because we are capable of intelligently working out what is good for us, 
and what damaging events we should avoid? Isn't it plausible that an unintelligent 
species might need a massive wallop of pain, to drive home a lesson that we can 
learn with less powerful inducement? At very least, I conclude that we have no 
general reason to think that non-human animals feel pain less acutely than we do, 
and we should in any case give them the benefit of the doubt.” In any case, if 
animals feel pain, they should learn to avoid it, and observing their avoidance 
behavior and reactions should be informative. Animal behavior is currently used in 
the (pre-)clinical assessment of pain, injury and disease (Dawkins 2004). More 
generally, a promising research area uses, as in revealed preference studies of 
humans in economics, observed animal behavior to assess animal welfare (see, 
e.g., Mason, Cooper and Clarebrough 2001). Many studies even indicate that some 
animals understand how to use money as a metrics for exchanging food or else (De 
Petrillo et al. 2019). 
 
Another example of the difficulty of studying sentience scientifically is the famous 
“mirror test” designed to study self-recognition or self-awareness (Gallup 1970). In 
the classic mirror test, an animal is anaesthetized and then marked on a part of the 
body that the animal cannot see. When the animal recovers, it faces a mirror. If the 
animal touches or investigates the mark, it indicates that the animal perceives the 
reflected image as itself, rather than of another animal. Only a few species pass the 
test including great apes, elephants, dolphins, sea lions, orcas, magpies. Moreover, 
several species fail the test, including some species of monkeys, pandas, and dogs. 
However, there are many problems with the test: some animals fear the mirror 
reflection, have poor sight, are not curious or interested in the task, etc. Dogs, for 
instance, pay relatively little attention to other dogs’ visual aspects, as they mostly 
care about how they smell (Rogers and Kaplan 2004). A recent study indicates that a 
species of fish may pass the test (Kohda et al. 2019), and concludes that this finding 
challenges our common interpretation of the mirror test: “Do we accept that these 
behavioural responses, which are taken as evidence of self-recognition in other 
species during the mark test, lead to the conclusion that fish are self-aware? Or do 
we rather decide that these behavioural patterns have a basis in a cognitive process 
other than self-recognition and that fish do not pass the mark test? If the former, 
what does this mean for our understanding of animal intelligence?”.  
 
What about plants? Plants are fundamentally different: They do not have a brain, 




since they are divisible. Many plants propagate through asexual reproduction. Some 
plants, such as the olive tree can live for several thousand years, while others, such 
as lianas, can be more than a hundred meters long. The botanist Françis Hallé talks 
about the “radical otherness” of vegetal life compared to animal life. Nevertheless, 
many popular writers or artists but also life scientists have suggested that plants 
have emotions, and possess a form of cognition. The proponents of the recent “plant 
neurobiology” approach draw parallels between electrical signaling in plants and 
nervous systems in animals, and hypothesize that plants can learn and possess 
consciousness, feelings, and intentionality. However, this hypothesis does not seem 
to resist proper scientific investigation. There is a basic evolutionary reason why this 
is the case. As plants do not move and do not react quickly, it would be inefficient for 
them to have these energy-intensive mental faculties without getting much benefit 
from them. In a recent synthesis paper, Lincoln Taiz and coauthors (2019) criticize in 
a systematic fashion plant neurobiologists’ findings, and consider that “the likelihood 
that plants, with their relative organizational simplicity and lack of neurons and 
brains, have consciousness to be effectively nil.” 
  
The bottom line is that, despite high levels of scientific uncertainty and complexity, 
and despite ongoing discussions regarding the definition and characterization of 
sentience, there are no strong scientific or logical reasons for thinking that only 
humans are sentient, nor that sentience is a binary notion. It seems much more 
sensible to consider that sentience is shared by most animals and that it is 
continuous and varies in degree. As Broom (2014) writes: “Animals vary in the extent 
to which they are aware of themselves (DeGrazia, 1996) and of their interactions 
with the environment, including their ability to experience pleasurable states such as 
happiness and aversive states such as pain, fear and grief. This capacity may be 
referred to as their degree of sentience”. However, sentience is probably limited to 
animals with current scientific knowledge indicating that the likelihood that plants are 
sentient is close to zero.  
 
3. Animals in Economics 
 
There are remarkably few published papers in leading economics journals on animal 
welfare. Figure 3A shows that there are merely 32 recorded papers in the top 50 
economic journals according to Microsoft Academic’s database, with the first 
appearing in 1984 (see the Appendix for details). Since then interest in animal issues 
seems to have increased slightly, but there have nevertheless not been more than 
four relevant papers published in the selected journals for a given year. When we 
restrict the search to the commonly accepted top 5 economics journals there are no 
hits at all. The most cited paper from Figure 3A is Corporate social responsibility in 
the supply chain: An application in the food industry (Maloni and Brown 2006). As 
the title suggests, animal welfare is not the main focus of this paper. This kind of 




search results (despite using the keywords <animal welfare>, <animal rights>, and 
<speciesism>), with only around half of the results focussing on animal interests, and 
many of these through the lens of humans’ altruistic valuation.  
 
 
Figure 3A. Economists’ lack of interest in animals. Notes Bibliometric search of the WEB OF 
SCIENCETM in July 2019 with the key words <animal welfare> or <animal rights> or <speciesism>; 
hits are articles published during any year in Microsoft Academic’s top 50 economics journals, ranked 
by their h-index for all years. 
 
The Microsoft Academic database is not exhaustive, of course.6  Many Journals in 
the top 50 list are not considered to be important in standard economics, and 
concern adjacent fields such as management. Hence, Figure 3A may even 
overestimate the study of animals in economics. Figure 3B represents the number of 
papers using some specific keywords. It suggests that economists have preferred to 
focus on topics that may seem less important to many, such as “fashion”. When 
animals are studied, it is usually in terms of their use by humans, as for “fishing”. 
Strikingly, the study of the animals’ flesh, “meat”, dominates the study of their 
interests, with 290 hits versus 32. Another illustration concerns the JEL codes list 
pervasively used by economists. As we indicate on the first page, this list does not 
contain any entry explicitly referring to animals. For the sake of comparison, it 
contains an entry “L67: Other Consumer Nondurables: Clothing, Textiles, Shoes, 
and Leather Goods; Household Goods; Sports Equipment”. 
 
                                                 





Figure 3B. Number of academic papers by economists on various topics. Notes Bibliometric 
search of the WEB OF SCIENCETM with the key words <fishing>, <fashion>, <meat>, <animal 
welfare> or <animal rights> or <speciesism>; hits are articles published during any year in Microsoft 
Academic’s top 50 economics journals, ranked by their h-index for all years. 
 
Animals are thus largely absent from economics. Economists often talk of “Animal 
Spirits” not to refer to the subjective experience of animals, but rather to describe 
human instincts and emotions that influence economic phenomena such as financial 
markets (Keynes 1936, Akerlof and Shiller 2009). This is the only use of the word 
animal in Gregory Mankiw’s Macroeconomics (2009), and we did not find any 
reference to animals in Andreu Mas-Colell’s classic Microeconomic Theory (1995). 
An exception concerns the study of animals in lab economic experiments (Kagel, 
Battalio and Green 1995) or in neuroeconomics (Kalenscher and van Wingerden 
2011). This research usually studies similarities in economic and evolutionary 
theories of human and animal decision making. Many of the behavioral patterns and 
violations of rationality found in humans are usually found in animals too (Ainslie and 
Herrnstein 1981, Santos and Rosati 2015). However the main focus of this research 
is not animal welfare, but human behavior and ultimately human welfare.  
 
In welfare economics, a central concept is the veil of ignorance proposed by John 
Rawls and John Harsanyi, which is related to the Adam Smith’s notion of the 
impartial spectator. The concept is based on a thought experiment in which people 
making political decisions must imagine that they know nothing about their own 
identity, so that they can overcome their self-serving bias and in turn be morally 
impartial. Browsing various examples given in the literature, people are asked to 




class, abilities or talents; they can be slaves, physically handicapped, mentally 
retarded and so forth, but they usually cannot be animals. Many mental barriers are 
overcome in this thought experiment, but not that of species. The “impartial” 
spectator is thus usually speciesist. More generally, social choice and public 
economics, some major historical fields in economics, have essentially ignored 
animals. It is not clear why animals have been deemed to not fit into the research 
agenda of economists working in these fields, but this is revealing given how 
extensively and rigorously issues such as fairness, inequality and welfare have been 
explored in these fields. 
 
Natural resource and environmental economics  
 
In natural resource and environmental economics, animals are typically treated as 
inputs or consumption goods. Animals are therefore valued indirectly, insofar as the 
consumption (e.g. recreation, input to production, food) of animals leads to benefits 
for humans. Animals are a particular type of stock: renewable resources, because 
they can reproduce. A large portion of the literature on renewable resources, such as 
the study of fisheries, focuses on the “harvesting of animal species” (Perman et al. 
2003). Another focus is on biodiversity, which is “important in the provision of 
environmental services to economic activity in a number of ways” (Perman et al. 
2003). Here again, animals are also valued indirectly, as an input to biodiversity and 
thus human welfare.  
 
Valuation is also a major topic in environmental economics. This often involves 
measuring the economic value of use (direct and indirect) of animal species, along 
with non-use values, such as valuing the existence of a species, or possibly animal 
welfare. This is usually done via willingness-to-pay (WTP) studies (Harris 2006). 
There exist quite a number of contingent valuation studies for the preservation of 
wild animals for instance (MacMillan et al. 2002, Loomis 2006, Boardman et al. 
2011). These studies investigate the (ir)rationality of participants who may be subject 
to various standard psychological biases, such as “scope insensitivity”, e.g. valuing 
the lives of 10 birds equivalently to 1,000 birds; “proportion dominance”, valuing each 
life saved more in smaller populations (Bartels 2006); or the “identifiable victim 
effect”, placing more value on salient individual victims compared to statistical lives. 
More specifically, environmental valuation studies also raise the question about 
whether participants “correctly” assess animal welfare, and in particular whether 
these assessments are subject to biases due to anthropomorphism, (non)familiarity 
with certain animals, misrepresentations as well as genetic distance (Miralles, 
Raymond and Lecointre 2019). Moreover, these approaches do not solve the 
fundamental question of how to account for the intrinsic value of animals, 
independent from humans. Steven McMullen (2016) concludes that “while it is 




in favor of animal interests, this approach ends up adding little in actual applications 
(...) and carries little ethical weight outside of an anthropocentric worldview”. 
 
In natural resource economics, analysis often focuses on optimal behaviors (e.g. 
consumption, pollution) through time because current behavior affects future 
resource availability, with the extreme case being, in the case of animals, extinction. 
This is again done from an anthropocentric perspective, with a focus on “inducing 
market systems of economic organisation to take proper account of the ways… that 
what happens to these plants and animals affects human utilities.” (Perman, Ma, 
McGilvray and Common 2003). The economic impact of invasive species is also 
studied along with that of endangered species (Olson 2006, Gardener and Shogren 
1998). Endangered species legislation can be viewed as society acting in the interest 
of future generations, but also as humans agreeing with the principle that animals 
have the right to exist, regardless of the economic cost that it imposes on society.  
The legislation can certainly be very costly (Ando and Langpap 2018). Nevertheless, 
the approach is not concerned by the wellbeing of individual animals per se, but 
rather by the (non-)existence of animal species. Furthermore, the environmental 
benefits of preservation are usually computed using an anthropocentric method.  
 
Agricultural economics   
 
Here animals are treated as inputs to the production of animal products such as 
meat, milk or eggs. The word “livestock” used in agricultural economics is revealing: 
animals are treated as living stocks. The only mention of animals in the subject index 
of the Handbook of Agricultural Economics is “animal wastes” (Gardner and Rausser 
2002). Topics of interest include the valuation of food safety in meat (Mørkbak, 
Christensen and Gyrd-Hansen 2009), examining the effect of information about 
animal welfare on consumer WTP for animal-based products (Napolitano et al. 
2008), estimating potential economic and environmental improvements to farms 
(Asmild and Hougaard 2007), and assessing consumer preferences regarding 
antibiotic use in animal production (Lusk, Noorwod and Pruitt 2006). There are 
several dozen studies about WTP for farm animal welfare in agricultural economics 
capturing indirectly humans’ altruistic valuation of animal welfare (Nocella, Hubbard 
and Scarpa 2009, Lagerkvist, Johan and Hess 2010). 
 
Jason Lusk and F. Bailey Norwood in a series of papers and an excellent book have 
focussed on questions concerning farm animal welfare. They have for instance 
examined animal welfare as a public good and outlined cost-benefit analysis taking 
into account farm animals, conducted revealed preferences research, estimated the 
cost of animal welfare improvements, studied vegetarianism, and Lusk has 
suggested creating a market for animal welfare using credits, analogous to 
emissions trading schemes (Lusk and Norwood 2011a, Lusk and Norwood 2011b, 




welfare is only accounted for indirectly through consumers’ preferences. In the same 
vein, Harald Grethe (2017) discusses consumer demand for animal welfare, 
emphasizing the “preference gap” between consumer and citizen perspectives. A 
possible explanation for this gap is the cognitive dissonance leading to the “meat 
paradox” hypothesis: consumers form self-serving beliefs about animal welfare to 
reduce the moral guilt associated with their meat consumption (Hestermann, Le 




As illustrated in Section 2, natural scientists and in particular ecologists are usually 
interested in the number of animals and work at the species’ level. The focus is thus 
on the populations and ecosystems’ natural equilibria, but not on individuals, and 
especially not on the welfare of individual animals. Moreover, some argue that 
natural scientists have an idyllic view of natural processes, and of the preservation of 
nature (Horta 2010, Dorado 2015, Faria and Páez 2015). These views have probably 
impacted ecological economics which also tends to focus on population issues and 
environmental preservation, and do not typically study animals’ welfare. A central 
concept in ecological economics is the tragedy of the commons. Ecologist Garrett 
Hardin (1968) famously explains in the context of pasture grazing: the tragedy 
comes from each herdsman asking, "What is the utility to me of adding one more 
animal to my herd?", leading to overgrazing because the negative grazing externality 
is not internalized by each herdsman. We note however that another sentient being 
is involved in the tradeoff, without even being considered or discussed in the global 
commons literature.  
 
Michael Common and Sigrid Stagl (2005) write that “there is no difference at all 
between ecological economics and neoclassical economics. Both are 
anthropocentric, as well as utilitarian.” (Common and Stagl 2005). Ecological 
economics pioneers Robert Costanza, Herman Daly and Joy Bartholomew (1991) 
make this clear when defining sustainability: “Sustainability is a relationship between 
human economic systems and larger dynamic, but normally slower-
changing, ecological systems in which 1) human life can continue indefinitely, 2) 
human individuals can flourish, and 3) human cultures can develop; but in which 
effects of human activities remain within bounds, so as not to destroy the diversity, 
complexity, and function of the ecological life support system.” Other typical topics in 
ecological economics include examining “animals as open systems” (Common and 
Stagl 2005), the function of different species, animal food-gathering strategies, 
ecosystem structure (Daly and Farley 2004), and studying the population dynamics 
of animal species and the resulting equilibrium.  
 
4. Directly Valuing Animals in Economics 




We have emphasized in the previous section that research in economics has 
essentially ignored the welfare of animals. At best, animal welfare is accounted only 
indirectly through personal humans’ preferences. McMullen (2016) argues that “the 
most important reason for economists’ silence (...) is that many ethical questions are 
framed as personal matters, rather than as questions of justice”. Yet Johanson-
Stennman (2018) argues that “it is possible, and indeed relatively straightforward, to 
extend the conventional theory of welfare measurements to the case where animal 
welfare carries intrinsic weight in the SWF [Social Welfare Function].” In this section, 
we present as an illustration a few early works in economics that have attempted to 
value directly animal welfare. These works share a common point: they consider a 
social planner who acts on behalf of animals. In other words, animals’ welfare enters 
directly into the SWF.  
 
Charles Blackorby and David Donaldson (1992) consider a multi-species model with 
both humans and animals. The SWF is utilitarian with equal weight on humans and 
animals, and so can be interpreted as anti-speciesist. Humans produce and 
consume animals. Production is costly, and humans derive utility from consumption. 
The novelty is that farm animals’ welfare is directly accounted for in the SWF. 
Because it is an optimal (animals) population issue, Blackorby and Donaldson use 
critical-level utilitarianism, which allows them to avoid problems associated with total 
and average utilitarianism. Humans eat either grain or animals, and animals eat 
grain. Humans can provide more grain than necessary for animals’ survival because 
this increases animals’ welfare (but not the quality of meat) at the cost of their own 
welfare. Blackorby and Donaldson identify several possible optimal solutions in 
terms of the production and consumption of animals. One solution features minimal 
animal welfare and high meat consumption, while another solution features 
vegetarianism, implying that animals will not be produced and thus will not exist. The 
authors also discuss implementation issues. Since market forces are driven by 
humans, the optimal solution is not implemented at the equilibrium. If the social 
planner wants to increase the level of animal welfare, taxing meat is not enough: it 
decreases the consumption of animals, but animal welfare is still kept at minimum by 
humans. The authors thus stress that direct control of animal welfare may be 
necessary.  
 
Blackorby and Donaldson (1992)’s paper is a major contribution to the literature.7 
However, we must recognize that it proposes a very utilitarian view of animals who 
only exist for the sake of humans, i.e. because humans like to eat animals. This view 
is arguably problematic morally. In their seminal book Zoopolis, Will Kymlicka and 
Sue Donaldson (2011) argue that animals should not be humans' property, and thus 
should not be raised for humans' consumption. But Kymlicka and Donaldson also 
                                                 
7 It may become, we believe, a seminal paper. Yet it has been mostly overlooked so far in the 
economics literature. At the time of this writing, i.e. more than 25 years after publication, it is cited only 




contend that this should not imply that this is the end of farm animals. Instead, they 
support the preservation of humans’ relationships with farm animals. They suggest 
granting them no less than citizenship since farm animals have the capacity to 
comply with some social norms and to cooperate. Obviously, letting animals satisfy 
their own preferences would raise various sorts of issues. One concerns the famous 
“liberal paradox”, as there may be a conflict between animals’ preferred choices and 
humans’ views about whether animals should count morally and how. 
 
How can animal welfare fit into a SWF? As we said above, Blackorby and Donaldson 
(1992) consider a utilitarian SWF with equal moral weight for humans and animals. 
This SWF has the advantage of being simple and satisfying the standard impartiality 
(or anonymity) axiom. However, it does not seem morally plausible. Assigning the 
same moral weight to a human and a rat or even an insect is an assumption that few 
would accept. Moreover, Section 2 provides an argument for setting different moral 
weights as we argued that the degree of sentience likely varies across species. 
Hence, an alternative would be, as in Espinosa and Treich (2019), to consider 
anonymity within species, but not across species; namely to assume a “semi-
speciest” approach where different species have different moral weights. As a 
starting point, several animal charities are currently computing “animal welfare 
weights” to identify priorities in philanthropy. Mark Budolfson and Dean Spears 
(2019a) propose estimating these weights with the number of neurons in the brain of 
an average member of a species. With this assumption, they estimate that a human 
life year is worth about 344 mammal life years, and about 10,700 fish life years. In 
another paper, they show that this approach may have drastic implications for 
climate policy, depending in particular on the moral weight given to insects 
(Budolfson and Spears 2019b). 
 
Farm animals, but also pets and animals used in science, are the property of 
humans. The works of animal rights scholars such as Francione, Regan or Steve 
Wise suggest that the issue of property rights is the most important force leading to 
the exploitation of animals and their resulting poor welfare. In the law, animals are 
considered as “things” and cannot have rights and duties. In contrast, economists 
such as Ronald Coase hold a favorable view of property rights. A major contribution 
of environmental economics is that well-defined property rights can help solve 
traditional market failures such as the “tragedy of the commons”. Property rights may 
in turn help animals. McMullen (2016) explains for instance that property rights 
contributed to saving the American bison from extinction and to mitigating with 
success over-fishing. Animal ownership creates incentives to take care of animals 
and to limit damages caused to others by the owned animal. But property rights also 
generate incentives to pursue production efficiency in the farming industry, an 
objective which is typically not aligned with animal welfare. The intersection of 
property rights and animal welfare is certainly complex, and is worth further 





In reference to evolutionary biology, Yew-Kwang Ng (1995) introduces the term 
“welfare biology” to mean the study of living things with respect to their welfare. The 
emphasis here is on wild animals. Ng identifies three basic questions in welfare 
biology: “Which species are affective sentients capable of welfare? Do they enjoy 
positive or negative welfare? Can their welfare be dramatically increased?”, and 
emphasizes that when scientists “use the apparently subjective terms of wellbeing 
such as welfare… they actually mean fitness for survival or abundance in the 
number of species concerned, as if the subjective sense of ‘welfare’ has absolutely 
no place in science.” He goes on and argues that the “time is ripe for the recognition 
of welfare biology as a valid field of scientific study”. Nevertheless, about 25 years 
after this publication, it does not seem that welfare biology has really taken off as a 
field of research.  
 
In a recent follow up to Ng (1995), Zach Groff and Ng (2019) write that “at least 
based on evolutionary theory alone, we should be agnostic with regard to whether 
total suffering will exceed enjoyment or vice versa.” The question of the net welfare 
of animal populations is important because, under a broadly utilitarian framework, it 
has implications regarding desirable population levels and the direction in which we 
ought to change population levels at the margin (Gosseries and Meijers 2019). For 
instance, a positive (resp. negative) farm animal welfare may justify increasing (resp. 
decreasing) the numbers of farm animals (Espinosa and Treich 2019). Similarly, if 
we believe that many, perhaps most, wild animals have lives that include more 
suffering than positive wellbeing, as does Oscar Horta (2010, 2018), a reduction of 
animal biomass might not necessarily be a curse for the animals. Due to their 
agnosticism on this question, Groff and Ng (2019) believe that “it makes sense to 
base one’s views on environmental issues on the more known benefits (and costs) of 
nature for humans.” Of course, even if we believe that for animals’ sake it would be 
better to reduce population levels, other considerations, such as civilizational stability 
and sustainability might push us in the opposite direction. 
 
Welfare biology might recommend specific policies. Motivated by a Kangaroo cull in 
Australia, Matthew Clarke and Ng (2006) model the interaction between population 
dynamics and welfare maximization for animals. They emphasize that “Natural 
selection favours the maximization of the number of surviving offspring [and] need 
not result in the maximization of the welfare of individuals in the species”. Various 
species leave many offspring of which just a few survive. The idea is that a lower 
birth rate may increase animal welfare. To study this, Clarke and Ng consider the 
maximization over the birth rate of both intertemporal total and average welfare and 
study exponential vs. non-exponential growth in the case of a single animal 
population. They show that optimal birth rates are lower in the case of welfare 
maximization vs. growth maximization, while the survival rates are higher. This holds 




competing populations in a Lotka-Volterra model. In this model, the choice of birth 
rates does not affect the population sizes at equilibrium, and as a result “welfare 
could be much higher with lower birth rates without even reducing numbers (at 
equilibrium)”. 
 
These results suggest that it could be legitimate for humans to intervene in nature in 
order to improve animals’ welfare, for instance, to vaccinate or sterilize animals. 
Tyler Cowen (2003) goes a step further and discusses the issue of predation. He 
notes that more animals are killed via carnivorism than are sustained by such killing, 
suggesting that, in general, predators reduce net social utility. There may be 
exceptions, such as when predators significantly reduce starvation among their prey 
by limiting population numbers. However, “not all predators benefit their prey at all 
margins”, and “in those cases where predators truly do benefit their prey, we may 
wish to intervene and provide greater support for the predators. There is no a priori 
reason to believe that nature has provided a welfare-maximizing balance of power 
between predator and prey, which again leads us back to the possibility of policing.” 
 
This interventionist approach is undoubtedly very controversial. It raises many 
concerns such as the potential cost of these interventions. Governments typically 
lack the resources to manage human affairs and enforce regulation. Adding the 
immense burden involved in managing the animal kingdom seems unrealistic. 
Anticipating this critique, Cowen notes that policing nature need not be absurdly 
costly in some cases though, because “Current policies... often subsidize the 
propagation of carnivorous animals...It would be easy to limit or eliminate these 
programs, which again suggests that policing nature need not mean sending out a 
policeman to stop one group of ants from killing another.” Indeed, it also does not 
seem very costly in many cases to assist animals in great suffering or near-death 
conditions when possible or to develop vaccination or sterilization campaigns 
(Garrido et al. 2011, Hall, Nixon and Aitken 2017). Another major concern, however, 
is that of mistakes of human intervention due to lack of knowledge and poor 
planning. There are many examples of erroneous human interventions in 
ecosystems leading to ecological catastrophes. 
 
Justifications for human intervention in nature are typically based on utilitarian 
arguments (such as reducing the sum of suffering in this world, and thus focusing on 
wild animals because they are so numerous). This has raised various ethical 
debates. Jennifer Everett (2001) makes an empirical claim against the interventionist 
argument, contending that “the state of affairs in which predation occurs in nature 
without regular interference from humans is better than that in which we attempt to 
prevent it”. Martha Nussbaum (2006) believes that the very idea of intervention is 
repugnant morally. Kymlicka and Donaldson (2011) argue that we should in general 
intervene less, and not more, in nature in order to respect the autonomy and 




determination. Horta (2013) argues that although Kymlicka and Donaldson (2011)’s 
position sometimes allows intervention in nature, their suggested limits on 
intervention are based on false empirical beliefs about animals in the wild whose 
situation can be “be considered analogous to one of humanitarian catastrophe, or to 
that of irretrievably failed states.” Kymlicka and Donaldson (2013) responded by 
arguing that these “claims about the apparent incompetence of wild animals to 
protect their members” are based on “biased accounts of competence” noting that 




The field of economics so far has only been concerned by the welfare of humans. In 
other words, economics research has been speciesist. It is perhaps time to 
investigate the implications of anti-speciesism in economics. Doing so may lead to 
stimulating research. The field of welfare economics, broadly speaking, is primarily 
concerned. Research on whether and how to include animals in the social objective 
may require the development of novel methodological approaches in the field, which 
can perhaps be compared to the paradigm shift towards the inclusion of humans’ 
behavioral limitations. Environmental economics can provide an umbrella for some of 
this economic research on animals. Environmental economics is concerned by 
nature, and since many animals live in nature, environmental economics is logically 
concerned by animals. But animals are not solely resources, biodiversity or 
commodities at the disposal of humans. Biologically, animals are far more similar to 
humans than plants. Arguably, as many ancient and modern philosophers have 
stressed, animals should receive moral consideration. This should matter, at least 
sometimes, in environmental economics.  
 
The challenges to come are obviously important and multiple. More research is 
required on animal welfare and sentience. Although animal welfare has been of 
concern for thousands of years in religion, philosophy, and culture, the study of 
animal welfare using rigorous scientific methods is relatively recent, and a lot 
remains to be learned. How can animal welfare be improved? How should we define 
and measure sentience? How should we treat scientific uncertainty regarding which 
species are sentient? We argued above that sentience is probably better conceived 
as a continuous concept. How then should we translate this into a social objective? 
While it is still difficult, if not taboo, to compare the utility of different human beings, 
the comparison between humans and animals, and among animals themselves, is 
obviously a daunting ethical task but also complicated practical one. In any case, 
more research is necessary to link animal sciences to economic studies. For 
instance, there are only a few papers that compute the costs and benefits of 
improving animal welfare. Following economic methodology, the development of 
revealed preferences research based on animal choices is an interesting research 




effective altruism movement in the philanthropic world, which prioritizes altruistic 
actions based on their cost-effectiveness, is a great illustration of how economics 
can be used in practice to contribute to animal-related issues. 
 
The research agenda is not limited to normative issues such as welfare 
measurement or social choice. Possible topics at the interface of animal welfare 
issues and standard environmental economics abound. Let us mention a few. Meat 
production affects land use, ecosystems and deforestation which all contribute to 
climate change and biodiversity loss. Cultured meat (that is, meat produced in vitro 
from animal cells) may be commercialized in a few years with possibly wide 
reductions of environmental pollution and in the use of land for animal feed and 
farming. Cruelty-free products and vegan investment funds have emerged and 
become part of global corporate social and environmental responsibility initiatives. 
Endangered species legislation is expected to evolve given increasing rates of 
species’ extinction. Hunting and fishing have complex effects on ecosystems and 
animal populations. Rewilding programs cause externalities for humans but also for 
other animals. Building cities differently to reduce energy use and pollution from 
transportation affects urban animal populations such as rats or pigeons. Policies 
regarding noise and light pollutions might considerably impact animals and their 
ecosystem. All these complex issues deserve to be addressed with an eye on animal 
welfare implications.  
 
Animal issues also provide an interesting domain of application in political economy. 
Groups of farmers and hunters have traditionally been very powerful politically in 
many developed countries. But animal activists have become better organized and 
more efficient due to information spreading and facilitated coordination through the 
internet. The general public is increasingly aware of wild animal extinction issues and 
of poor animal rearing conditions associated with industrial farming. In many rich 
countries, the proportion of vegetarians and vegans (usually between 3 to 10%) is 
now greater than that of farmers in the population. Several parties for animals have 
their own political platform and are on the rise, especially across Europe, raising the 
question of whether these parties will or should merge in the long term with more 
traditional green parties. Behavioral economics may also contribute. The attitude of 
consumers and citizens toward animals, and in particular moral dissonance, 
anthropocentrism, habits, and social norms certainly play a key role. Finally, the 
study of preference transmission seems central. Parents and teachers shape the 
attitudes and perceptions of children toward nature and its resident animals. 
Observing all these recent trends, we may reasonably expect that our descendants 
as well as future (environmental) economists will more conscientiously value the 
welfare of animals.  







      
The bibliometric analyses depicted in Figures 3A and 3B are based on queries of the 
Web of ScienceTM. For Figure 3A, the query words <animal welfare>, <animal 
rights>, and <speciesism> were used to search through abstracts, titles and key 
words of articles published during any year in Microsoft Academic’s top 50 
economics journals, ranked by their h-index for all years. For Figure 4B, the query 
words <fishing>, <fashion>, and <meat> were also used to conduct the same 
search. The journals are, in rank order:  The American Economic Review, Journal 
of Finance, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal 
of Political Economy, Econometrica, Management Science, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, The Economic Journal, Research Policy, Review of Financial 
Studies, Journal of Economic Perspectives, The Review of Economic Studies, The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, World Development, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Economic Literature, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Business 
Ethics, Ecological Economics, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Business 
Research, Energy Policy, Journal of International Economics, Journal of 
Development Economics, Journal of Management Studies, Tourism Management, 
European Economic Review, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal 
of Operations Management, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Journal of 
Economic Theory, The RAND Journal of Economics, Climatic Change, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, The Journal of Business, Annals of Tourism 
Research, Journal of Labor Economics, International Journal of Production 
Economics, California Management Review, International Organization, Journal of 
Money Credit and Banking, Accounting Organizations and Society, Journal of 
Human Resources, Marketing Science, Public Administration Review, Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, American Journal of Political Science. 
The top 5 economic Journals mentioned in the text are The American Economic 
Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
and Review of Economic Studies. 
            
References  
 
 Ainslie, George, and R.J. Herrnstein. (1981). Preference reversal and delayed 
reinforcement. Animal Learning & Behavior, 9(4):476-482. 
Akerlof, George and Robert Shiller. (2009). Animal Spirits. Princeton 
University Press. 
American Pet Products Association (APPA) (2018), ‘Historical trends 
1996 – 2018’. 
Armstrong, Susan and Richard Botzler. (2003). Environmental Ethics: 




Ando Amy and Christian Langpap. 2018. The economics of species 
conservation. Annual Review of Resource Economics  10: 445 - 467. 
Aristotle. (350 BC) Politics. Translation by Benjamin Jowett, The Internet 
Classics Archive. http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html.  
Asmild, Mette and Jens Leth Hougaard. (2007). Economic versus 
environmental improvement potentials of Danish pig farms. Agricultural Economics, 
35(2):171-181.  
Baars, Bernard. (2001). There are no known differences in brain mechanisms 
of consciousness between humans and other mammals. Animal Welfare, 10(1):31-
40. 
Baron Yinon M., Rob Philips and Ron Milo. (2018). The biomass distribution 
on earth, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(25):650611. 
Bartels, Daniel M. (2006). Proportion dominance: The generality and 
variability of favoring relative savings over absolute savings. Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes 100, 76–95.  
Bentham, Jeremy. (1780). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation. https://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML.html.  
Blackorby, Charles and David Donaldson. (1992). Pigs and Guinea pigs: A 
note on the ethics of animal exploitation. The Economic Journal, 120(4):1345-1369. 
Boardman Anthony E., David Greenberg, Aidan Ving and David Weimer. 
(2011). Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice. Prentice Hall. 
Brown, Gardener and Jason Shogren. (1998). Economics of the endangered 
species Act. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(3):3-20. 
Budolfson, Mark and Dean Spears. (2019a). Public policy, consequentialism, 
the environment, and non-human animals, forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of 
Consequentialism, Oxford University Press.  
Budolfson, Mark and Dean Spears. (2019b). Optimal climate policy including 
animal welfare. Working paper, Princeton CFI. 
Butler, Ann and Rodney Cotterill. (2006). Mammalian and avian 
neuroanatomy and the question of consciousness in birds. The Biological Bulletin,  
211(2):106-127. 
Broom, Donald. (2014). Sentience and Animal Welfare. CABI Publishing. 
Cambridge Declaration on Animal Consciousness. (2012) 
http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf. 
Clarke Matthew, and Yew-Kwang Ng. (2006). Population dynamics and 
animal welfare: Issues raised by the culling of kangaroos in Puckapunyal. Social 
Choice and Welfare 27(2):407-22. 
Chalmers, David. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal 
of consciousness studies, 2(3):200-19. 
Common, Michael and Sigrid Stagl. (2005). Ecological Economics: An 
Introduction. Cambridge University Press. 
Costanza, Robert, Herman Daly and Joy Bartholomew. (1991). Goals, agenda 




Ecological Economics: The Science and Management of Sustainability. Columbia 
University Press, NY. 
Daly, Herman and Joshua Farley. (2004). Ecological Economics: Principles 
and Applications. Island Press.  
Dawkins, Marian S. (2004) Using behavior to assess animal welfare. Animal 
Welfare, 13, 3-7. 
Dawkins, Richard. (2011). Richard Dawkins on vivisection: “But can they 
suffer?”. http://boingboing.net/2011/06/30/richard-dawkins-on-v.html. 
DeGrazia, David. (1996). Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral 
Status. Cambridge University Press. 
De Juana, Eduardo. (1992). Class AVES, in Handbook of the birds in the 
world. Lynx Edicions. 
De Petrillo, Francesca, Martina Caroli, Emanuele Gori, Antonia Micucci,  · 
Serena Gastaldi, Sacha BourgeoisGironde and Elsa Addessi (2019) Evolutionary 
origins of money categorization and exchange: An experimental investigation in 
tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.) Animal Cognition, 22:169-86. 
Donaldson, Sue and Will Kymlicka. (2013). A defense of animal citizens and 
sovereigns. Law, Ethics and Philosophy, 1:143-160. 
Dorado, Daniel. (2015). Ethical interventions in the wild. An annotated 
bibliography. Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism, 3:219-238. 
Dunbar R.I.M., and Shultz, Suzanne. (2007). Evolution in the social brain. 
Science 317(5843):1344-1347. 
Edelman, David, Bernard Baars and Anil K. Seth. (2005). Identifying 
hallmarks of consciousness in non-mammalian species. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 14(1):169-187. 
Espinosa, Romain and Nicolas Treich. (2019). Animal welfare: 
Antispeciesism, veganism and a “life worth living”. Working Paper.  
Everett, Jennifer. (2001) Environmental ethics, animal welfarism, and the 
problem of predation: A Bambi lover’s respect for nature, Ethics & the Environment, 
6(1):42-67. 
Faria, Catia and Eze Páez. (2015). Animals in need: The problem of wild 
animal suffering and intervention in nature”. Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism, 
3:7-13 
Fédération Européenne de l’Industrie des aliments pour Animaux Familiers 
(FEDIAF) (2017), ‘Facts & Figures 2016’. 
Fisher, James and Roger Tory Peterson. (1964). The world of birds: a 
comprehensive guide to general ornithology. Macdonald. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. FAOSTAT 
database. http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QA.  
Francione, Gary. (2008). Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of 




Fraser, David, and Amelia MacRae. (2011). Four types of activities that affect 
animals: Implications for animal welfare science and animal ethics philosophy. 
Animal Welfare, 20(4):581-590. 
Gallup, Gordon G. (1970). Chimpanzees: Self-recognition. Science 167: 86-
87. 
Gardner, Bruce and Gordon Rausser (ed.). (2002). Handbook of Agricultural 
Economics. Elsevier Science.  
Garrido Joseba, Iker Sevilla, Beatriz Beltrán-Beck, Esmeralda Minguijón, 
Cristina Ballesteros, Ruth Galindo, Mariana Boadella, Konstantin Lyashchenko, 
Beatriz Romero, Maria Victoria Geijo, Francisco Ruiz-Fons, Alicia Aranaz, Ramón 
Juste, Joaquín Vicente, José de la Fuente, Christian Gortázar. (2011). Protection 
against tuberculosis in Eurasian wild boar vaccinated with heat-inactivated 
mycobacterium bovis. PLoS One, 6(9):e24905. 
Gaston, Kevin, Tim Blackburn and Kees Klein Goldewijk. (2003). Habitat 
conversion and global avian biodiversity loss. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: 
Biological Sciences, 270(1521):1293-300. 
Gaston, Kevin and Tim Blackburn. (1997). How many birds are there? 
Biodiversity & Conservation, 6(4):615-625. 
Gosseries, Axel and Tim Meijers. (2019). Animal population ethics. Working 
paper. 
Grethe, Harald. (2017): The economics of farm animal welfare. Annual 
Review of Resource Economics 9: 75-94 
Groff, Zach and Yew-Kwang Ng. (2019). Does suffering dominate enjoyment 
in the animal kingdom? An update to welfare biology. Biology and Philosophy, 
34(4):40. 
Gruen, Lori. (2017). The moral status of animals. The Stanford Encyclopaedia 
of Philosophy. 
Grandin, Temple, 2006. (1995). Thinking in Pictures. Vintage Press. 
Green, Che. (2016). Animal advocacy by numbers. 
Hall, Sally, Brett Nixon and Robert Aitken. (2016). Non-surgical sterilisation 
methods may offer a sustainable solution to feral horse (Equus caballus) 
overpopulation. Reproduction Fertility and Development, 29(9):1655-1666. 
Hardin, Garret. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859): 
12430-1248. 
Harris, Jonathan. (2006). Environmental and Natural Resource Economics: A 
Contemporary Approach. Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Hestermann Nina, Le Yaouanq Yves and Nicolas Treich. (2018). An economic 
model of the meat paradox. Mimeo. 
Holtug, Nils. (2007). Equality for animals. In New Waves in Applied Ethics, 
edited by Jesper Ryberg, Thomas S. Petersen, and Clark Wolf, 1–24. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Horta, Oscar. (2010). Debunking the idyllic view of natural processes. 




Horta, Oscar. (2013). Zoopolis, intervention, and the state of nature. Law, 
Ethics and Philosophy, 1:113-125. 
Horta, Oscar. (2018). Concern for wild animal suffering and environmental 
ethics: What are the limits of the disagreement? Les Ateliers de l’Éthique / The 
Ethical Forum, 13: 85-100. 
Huang, Ching-Yu and Ping-Chun Lucy Hou. (2004). Density and diversity of 
litter amphibians in a monsoon forest of Southern Taiwan. Zoological Studies, 
43(4):795-802. 
IPBES (2019) Summary for policymakers of the global assessment report on 
biodiversity and ecosystem services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. Advance unedited version: 
https://www.ipbes.net/system/tdf/spm_global_unedited_advance.pdf?file=1&type=no
de&id=35245  
Irigoien, Xabier, Thor Klevjer, Anders Røstad, Udane Martinez, Guillermo 
Boyra, José Luis Acuña, Antonio Bode, Fidel Echevarria, Juan Ignacio Gonzalez-
Gordillo, Santiago Hernandez-Leon, Susana Agusti, Dag Lorents Aksnes, Carlos 
Duarte and Stein Kaartvedt. (2014). Large mesopelagic fishes biomass and trophic 
efficiency in the open ocean. Nature Communications, 5:3271. 
Ishwar, N.M, Ravi Chellam and Ajith Kumar. (2001). Distribution of forest floor 
reptiles in the rainforest of Kalakad-Mundanthurai Tiger reserve, South India. Current 
Science, 80(3):413-418. 
Jennings, Simon, Frédéric Mélin, Julia Blanchard, Rodney Forster, Nicholas 
Dulyand and Rod Wilson. (2008). Global-scale predictions of community and 
ecosystem properties from simple ecological theory. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences, 275(1641):1375-1383.  
Johansson-Stenman, Olof. (2018). Animal welfare and social decisions: Is it 
time to take Bentham seriously? Ecological Economics, 145(C):90-103. 
Kaartvedt, Stein, Arved Staby and Dag Lorents Aksnes. (2012). Efficient trawl 
avoidance by mesopelagic fishes causes large underestimation of their biomass. 
Marine Ecology Progress Series, 456:1-6. 
Kagel, John, Raymond Battalio, Leonard Green. (1995) Economic Choice 
Theory: An Experimental Analysis of Animal Behavior. Press Syndicate of the 
University of Cambridge. 
Kalenscher, Tobias and Van Wingerden, Marijn. (2011) Why we should use 
animals to study economic decision making – A perspective, Frontiers in 
Neuroscience, 10.3389/fnins.2011.00082. 
Kant, Immanuel, 1963. (1780). Duties toward animals and spirits, in Lectures 
on Ethics. Translated by Louis Infield, Harper and Row. 
Kymlicka Will and Sue Donaldson. 2011. Zoopolis: A Political Theory of 
Animal Rights. Oxford University Press. 
Keynes, John Maynard. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest 




Knutsonn, Simon and Christian Munthe. (2017). A virtue of precaution 
regarding the moral status of animals with uncertain sentience. Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 30(2):213-224. 
Kohda, Masanori et al. (2019). If a fish can pass the mark test, what are the 
implications for consciousness and self-awareness testing in animals? Plos Biology 
17(2):e3000021. 
Lagerkvist, Carl Johan and Sebastian Hess. (2010). A meta-analysis of 
consumer willingness to pay for farm animal welfare. European Review of 
Agricultural Economics 38(1):55-78. 
Loomis, John. (2006). Use of contingent values of wildlife and habitat 
preservation in policy and benefit cost analyses. In Handbook on Contingent 
Valuation, Chapter 13. 
Lusk, Jason. (2011). The market for animal welfare. Agriculture and Human 
Values, 28(4):561-575. 
Lusk, Jason and F. Bailey Norwood. (2011a). Speciesism, altruism and the 
economics of animal welfare. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 
39(2):189–212. 
Lusk, Jason and F. Bailey Norwood. (2011b). Animal welfare economics. 
Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 33(4):463–483. 
Lusk, Jason, F. Bailey Norwood, and J. Ross Pruitt. (2006) Consumer 
demand for a ban on subtherapeutic antibiotic use in pork production. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics.  88(4):1015-1033. 
MacLean, Evan et al. (2014) The evolution of self-control. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 111 (20):E2140-E2148.  
MacMillan, Douglas C., Philip, Lorn, Hanley, Nick and Alvarez-Farizo, 
Begona. 2002. Valuing the non-market benefits of wild goose conservation: a 
comparison of interview and group-based approaches. Ecological Economics, 43(1): 
49-59. 
Maloni, Michael and Michael Brown. (2006). Corporate social responsibility in 
the supply chain: An application in the food industry. Journal of Business Ethics, 
68(1):35-52.  
Mankiw, Gregory. (2009). Macroeconomics. Worth Publishers.  
Mas-Colell, Andreu. (1995). Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press.  
Mason, Georgia J., Cooper, Jonathan and Clarebrough, Catherine. (2001). 
Frustrations of fur-farmed mink. Nature 410:35-36. 
Matheny, Gaverick and Kai Chan. (2005). Human diets and animal welfare: 
the illogic of the larder. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 18(6):579-
594. 
McMullen Steven (2016) Animals and the Economy. Palgrave McMillan. 
Miralles, Aurélien, Michel Raymond and Lecointre, Guillaume. (2019) 
Empathy and compassion toward other species decrease with evolutionary 




Mood, Alison and P. Brooke. (2012). Estimating the number of farmed fish 
killed in global aquaculture each year. 
Mood, Alison and P. Brooke. (2010). Estimating the number of fish caught in 
global fishing each year.  
Mørkbak, Morten Raun, Tove Christensen and Dorte Gyrd-Hansen. (2009). 
Valuation of food safety in meat – a review of stated preference studies. Acta 
Agriculturae Scandinavica, Section C — Food Economics, 5(2):63-74. 
Napolitano, Fabio, Corrado Pacelli, Antonio Girolami and Ada Braghieri. 
(2008). Effect of information about animal welfare on consumer willingness to pay for 
yogurt. Journal of Dairy Science, 91(3):910-917. 
Ng Yew-Kwang. (1995). Towards welfare biology: Evolutionary economics of 
animal consciousness and suffering. Biology and Philosophy, 10(3):255-85. 
Nocella, Giuseppe, Lionel Hubbard and Riccardo Scarpa. (2009). Farm 
animal welfare, consumer willingness to pay, and trust: Results of a cross-national 
survey. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 32(2):275-297. 
Norwood F. Bayley and Jayson L. Lusk (2011). Compassion by the Pound. 
Oxford University Press. 
Nozick, Robert. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books. 
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2006. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, 
Species Membership, Cambridge, Belknap Press. 
Olson, Lars. (2006). The economics of terrestrial invasive species: A review of 
the literature. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review. 35(1):178-194. 
Plato. (360 BC). The Republic. Translation by Benjamin Jowett, The Internet 
Classics Archive. http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html. 
Perman, Roger, Yue Ma, James McGilvray and Michael Common. (2003). 
Natural Resource and Environmental Economics. Pearson Education Limited. 
Proctor, Helen. (2012). Animal sentience: Where are we and where are we 
heading? Animals, 2(4):628-639. 
Raegan, Douglas and Robert Waide. (1996). The Food Web of a Tropical 
Rain Forest. University of Chicago Press. 
Rawls, John. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press. 
Regan, Tom. (1983). The Case for Animal Rights. University of California 
Press. 
Rogers Lesly J. and Gisela Kaplan. (2004). All animals are not equal. The 
interface between scientific knowledge and legislation for animal rights. In Cass R. 
Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum (ed) Animal Rights: Current Debates and New 
Directions. Oxford University Press. 
Rosati, Alexandra G. (2017). Foraging cognition: Reviving the ecological 
intelligence hypothesis, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9: 691-702. 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (1755). Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondements 
de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes. 
Rowlands, Mark (2009 [1998]) Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice, 




Rust, Joshua and Eric Schwitzgebel. (2014). The Behavior of Ethicists. 
Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. 
Santos, Laurie R., and Alexandra G. Rosati (2015). The evolutionary roots of 
human decision making. Annual Review of Psychology, 66, 321-347. 
Schönegger, Philipp and Wagner, Johannes. (2019). The moral behavior of 
ethics professors: A replication-extension in German-speaking countries. 
Philosophical Psychology 32 (4):532-559. 
Seth, Anil. (2016). Why fish pain cannot and should not be ruled out. Animal 
Sentience, 3(4).  
Singer, Peter. (1975). Animal Liberation.  Avon Books, New York. 
Singer, Peter. (1980). Utilitarianism and vegetarianism. Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 9, 325-37. 
Sorby-Adams, Annabel, Robert Vink and Renee Turner. (2018). Large animal 
models of stroke and traumatic brain injury as translational tools. American Journal 
of Physiology- Regulatory, Integrative and Comparative Physiology, 315(2):R165-
R190. 
Taiz, Lincoln, Daniel Alkon, Andreas Draguhn, Angus Murphy, Michael Blatt, 
Chris Hawes, Gerhard Thiel and David G. Robinson. (2019). Plants neither possess 
nor require consciousness. Trends in Plant Science. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tplants.2019.05.008 
Taylor, Katy, Nicky Gordon, Gill Langley and Wendy Higgins. (2008). ATLA – 
Alternatives to Laboratory Animals, 36(3):327. 
Tomasik, Brian. (2009). How many wild animals are there? 
Vasudevan, Karthikeyan, Ajith Kumar and Ravi Chellam. (2001). Structure 
and composition of rainforest floor amphibian communities in Kalakad- Mundanthurai 
Tiger Reserve. Current Science, 80(3):406-412. 
Vasudevan, Karthikeyan, Ajith Kumar, Barry R. Noon and Ravi Chellam. 
(2008). Density and diversity of the forest floor anurans in the rain forests of 
Southern Western Ghats, India. Herpetologica, 64(2):207-215. 
Veresolgu, Stavros, John Halley and Matthias Rillig. (2015). Extinction risk of 
soil biota. Nature Communications, 6:8862. 
Voltaire. (1764). The Philosophical Dictionary. Translated by H.I. Woolf, 
Hanover College Department of History. 
https://history.hanover.edu/texts/voltaire/volanima.html. 
Weaber, Robert and Jayson Lusk. (2010). The economic value of 
improvements in meat tenderness by genetic marker selection. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 92(5):1456–1471. 
Williams, C.B. The range and pattern of insect abundance. (1960). The 
American Naturalist, 94(875):137-151. 
Wilson, Rod, Frank Millero, Josi Taylor, Patrick Walsh, Villy Christensen, 
Simon Jennings and Martin Grosell. (2009). Contribution of fish to the marine 
inorganic carbon cycle. Science, 323(5912):359-62. 
Witwicki, Kelly. (2019). Global farmed and factory farmed animals estimates.  
